Victims Law Library

The accused was charged with murder with respect to the brutal stabbing of a young woman who has unknown to him. He attempted to rely on the defence of duress, claiming that he faced death threats over a drug debt and the dealers threatened to kill him if he did not carry out the murder. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge rejected the availability of duress because the availability of this defence was specifically removed from the defence by section 17 of the Criminal Code. The trial judge had indicated that the concept of fundamental justice must give significant weight to the sanctity of life and that the life of a murder victim must be equally protected by section 7 of the Charter

In this case, numerous accuseds were facing either murder charges or aiding and abetting in the murders with respect to the execution-style killing of eight members of the Banditos Motorcycle gang. One of the issues in the case was whether the defence of duress could be available in the context of being a party to murder as opposed to murder itself. The trial judge had found that there was no air of reality to the claim of duress but the Court of Appeal did consider whether it was potentially available and acknowledged the importance of the defence. The court acknowledged that the victim’s right to life was a crucial factor in assessing whether an accused’s conduct was proportional but was not completely determinative of the issue.

Two defendants were charged with multiple counts of kidnapping two people and sexually assaulting one of them. During the kidnapping, police used numerous tactics to try to locate the hostages. When they failed to locate them, they relied on section 184.4 of the Criminal Code, which allows the interception of private communications in an emergency, if certain factors are met. At issue was the constitutionality of section 184.4 of the Criminal Code in relation to section 8 of the Charter, and the admissibility of the evidence gathered by the interception. The Court found that the police officer was in a situation where he had to strike a balance between the accused's right to privacy and the victim's right to life, liberty and security of the person. Consequently, the Court ruled that article 184.4 was not unconstitutional and that the evidence was admissible.

The applicant, a non-profit organization dedicated to eradicating violence against women, challenged a law (the “Law”) that repealed the long-gun registration system in force since 1995. The applicant alleged that the law violated women's security of the person and equality rights, and that women in particular were susceptible to crimes committed by intimate partners in connection with the use of long guns. The Court identified a number of major weaknesses in the applicant's claim. In its analysis of section 7, the Court found no deprivation of life, liberty or security of person caused by State action. Statistical data did not establish a causal link between the register and the reduction of violence against women. The broader legislative context, including licensing requirements and other gun control measures, addressed public safety concerns without perpetuating stereotypes or disadvantaging women.

This was a sentencing related to sexual assault on a person under 16 years of age. The court went through all the various factors that a judge is required to weigh in the context of section 718 of the Criminal Code. Although the judge did not specifically mention the victim’s Charter rights, the judge did mention the “security of the person” of the victim when describing sexual assault as one of the more serious or grave offences. The court held at paragraph 14: Why is this? The case law and common sense tell us that sexual assault is a crime in which the perpetrator inflicts physical violence and violation on the victim but also dominates and degrades her. The physical harm is often minimal; but the emotional and psychological, devastating and the psychological ramifications, pernicious, devastating, and long lasting. It robs the victim of her most intimate security - security of the person. The victim is often fearful, angry, hostile and distrustful ever after.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, forcible confinement, suffocation and theft in respect of four plaintiffs. He requested a severance of the trial in respect of one complainant, and manisfested his intention to testify viva voce about this complainant. The Court examined the many factors that case law had developed to determine whether separation was appropriate. With regard to the impact on witnesses and complainants, the Court determined that this was not a relevant factor, as victims do not have Charter rights. In particular, the Court ruled as follows: "the last factors do not include the impact on potential witnesses and complainants. Separation may well require witnesses to appear and testify several times. This is very unfortunate for them, and leads to the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, multiple cross-examinations and the need to keep unfortunate incidents fresh in their minds for a longer period of time..."

In this case, the accused was prosecuted for sexual assault on two sex workers. The accused requested records of all previous interactions the police had had with one of the complainants, including a previous complaint of sexual assault and an incident in which she was a witness. One of the issues before the Court was whether the information relating to previous interactions with the police constituted a record containing personal information for which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court examined the issue of expectation of privacy in light of the jurisprudence on the right to privacy developed in the context of section 8 of the Charter. It concluded that with the sensitive nature of the information, these types of reports should be considered to be generally subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

This is a relatively recent case brought by the families of murder victims in the notorious case of Paul Bernardo and the murder of a police officer in Toronto. The families of the murder victims sought access to all information that was relied upon to any extent on the parole hearings of the offenders, including admission and discharge records, case management reports, discipline reports, education and training, healthcare, security, psychology, sentence administration, and visits and correspondence. The families relied to some extent on the public interest override in section 8(2)(m) of the Privacy Act, describing public interest to include “transparency, accountability and openness”. The Federal Court upheld decisions of the Parole Board of Canada and the Correctional Service of Canada not to disclose the requested information, observing that the institutions had properly weighed the public interest and the invasion of privacy

In this case, the Federal Court allowed a judicial review from a decision by the head of an institution not to release information relating to pensions relating to former members of Parliament in receipt of pension benefits. In considering the public interest override in section 8(2)(m) of the Privacy Act, the Court held that there was a strong public interest in the disclosure of the disputed information, given the current debate over MP pensions. The Court found that this was more than mere curiosity, but that the disclosure “may assist members of the public in assessing the fairness of the current pension scheme

In this case, the plaintiffs asked for a class to be certified as a class action, requesting declarations and monetary damages for family members of victims and missing and murdered Indigenous Canadian women because of the policies and conduct of the RCMP. In addition to claims related to “systemic negligence”, breaches of common law duties and breaches of various Human Rights Code rights, the plaintiffs alleged the breach of the Charter. In particular, the plaintiffs asserted breaches of section 7 of the Charter relating to security of the person, and section 15 relating to equality. In the result, all of the claims in the statement of claim were struck out. Specifically with respect to the Charter rights, the Federal Court observed that Charter rights are individual and could not be claimed by family members.