Bibliothèque des droits des victimes

 The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving, fleeing from a peace, officer unauthorized possession of a firearm, and driving while disqualified. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 7 a month's imprisonment. The accused is seeking a combined sentence of five to seven month's imprisonment. The issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in considering and relying on the vicitm's statements. The court aggreed thaht the sentencing judge had relied inappropriately on the content of the victim's statements, which contained criticism of the offender an expanded the facts beyond the aggreed statement. The court conclued that the combined sentence was not excessively long or severe and was therefore not affected by the error.

The defendant, aged 17, was charged with sexual assault and sexual abuse of a 13-year-old girl. The Crown argued that the witness, H.D., should be allowed to testify from outside the courtroom via closed-circuit television (CCTV) from Saskatoon, due to her fear and anxiety about testifying in open court and her concerns for her safety. The defence suggested that H.D. be allowed to testify behind a screen in the courtroom in the presence of the public. The issue was whether the witness, H.D., should be allowed to testify from outside the courtroom by videoconference from Saskatoon. The Court considered the age of the witness, the nature of the allegations and the configuration of the courtroom. It concluded that testimony by videoconference would alleviate H.D.'s fears and anxiety and would not impede the proper administration of justice or the accused's right to a fair trial.

Following a mass shooting at a school, the Crown Prosecutor requested a publication ban on information identifying the victims named in the attempted murder charges against the accused. An emergency discretionary publication ban was initially granted under section 486.5 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor then sought a mandatory publication ban under section 486.4(2.2) for victims who were minors at the time of the events. The national media opposed the discretionary and mandatory publication ban, arguing that it infringed their right to freedom of expression guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter. The question raised was whether section 486.4 (2.2) of the Criminal Code unfairly infringes on the right to freedom of expression protected by section 2(b). The Court concluded that section 486.4 (2.2) did not meet a ‘pressing and important’ need and infringed the right to freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) and dismissed the application for a publication ban.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, hit and run, and failing to comply with a peace officer. The Crown opposed the accused's release on primary, secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's tenuous ties to the community, his previous convictions and the seriousness of the alleged offences. The accused: argued in favour of his release, stating that he had ties to the community, including family and employment opportunities, and that he was willing to post bail and submit to electronic monitoring. The issue was whether the defendant's detention was necessary for the protection or safety of the public under the secondary ground. The Court concluded that the defendant's continued detention was justified on both the primary and secondary grounds. It stated that there was a high probability that the defendant, if released, would reoffend, necessitating his detention for the protection of the public.

In this case, the accused was charged with impaired driving and driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of more than 0.08 following a collision involving three vehicles. The defence requested disclosure of the contact details of several witnesses to the collision, which the prosecution opposed. The defence argued that failure to disclose this information violated the accused's right to a full and effective defence. The Crown argued that, as custodian, it was required to balance the witnesses' interests in privacy and safety with the rights guaranteed by the Charter. The court concluded that the ‘results of the investigation,’ including the contact details of potential witnesses, must be disclosed unless they are protected by professional secrecy or there is a risk of prejudice.

In this case, the applicant sought a prevention order for herself and her two children and a protection order alleging ongoing domestic violence and harassment by Bulloch. The respondent sought the cancellation of the existing protection order, denied the allegations of domestic violence, and contested the necessity of a prevention order. The issue was whether the protection order granted to Ms. Lafreniere should be set aside. It was also necessary to determine whether Ms. Lafreniere had demonstrated the necessity of a prevention order against Mr. Bulloch based on allegations of domestic violence and harassment. The court found Ms Lafreniere's testimony credible and supported by evidence, including instances of domestic violence and harassment by Mr Bulloch. The judge cancelled the protection order and replaced it with an indefinite prevention order, including provisions prohibiting all contact and limiting communications between Mr. Bulloch, Ms. Lafreniere and her eldest son.

The appellant, a former police officer, is appealing the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to breach of trust and sexual exploitation for kissing two complainants during police investigations. The trial judge considered that the impact on the victims was a significant aggravating factor. On appeal, he argued that the judge had erred in placing undue weight on the victim's statement and that the sentence of eight consecutive months for breach of trust was manifestly inappropriate. The Court emphasised that the judge responsible for determining the sentence is required to take the victim's statement into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the sentence imposed was not manifestly inappropriate when the kiss was considered in the context of the victim's history of abuse and her relationship of trust with the appellant.

This was sentencing for the offences of sexual assault, administering a stupefying drug and two breaches of recognizance. The judge noted that the victim indicated in her VIS that she “remains fearful for her personal safety”. The court the specifically referred to section 9 of the CVBR relating to victim’s security and section 10 relating to reasonable measures to protect the victim for intimidation and retaliation. The judge specifically noted that he/she took into account the victim’s protection and security interests.. Of particular interest in this case was that the judge assigned some of the informational rights found in the CVBR to the Crown Attorney and made the following order: The Crown shall inform J.C. of the sentence imposed on Zadeh. In addition, the Crown shall comply with the Information component contained in ss. 6 – 8 of the Canadian Victim Bill of Rights.

L’accusé a été reconnu coupable de conduite de façon dangereuse causant la mort, de conduite dangereuse causant des lésions corporelles. Il a fait appel des déclarations de culpabilité qui ont été rejeté. Après sa condamnation par le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine, l’accusé fait appel en sollicitant la réduction de la peine. La question de droit posé était de savoir si le juge chargé de déterminer la peine a commis une erreur en permettant au ministère public de soumettre des déclarations de la victime qui comportaient des photographies et vidéos de l’enfant décédée. La Cour a reconnu le rôle important des déclarations des victimes dans la détermination de la peine. Toutefois, il a souligné que le juge dans l’établissement de la peine doit prendre en considération la peine indiquée en prenant en considération tous les principes juridiques pertinents ainsi que les circonstances de l’infraction et du délinquant.

The accused is found guilty of knowingly making false statements under oath during a police investigation into a murder. The prosecution requested to present a statement from the mother regarding the impact of the crime on the victim. The defence opposed the admission of the statement, arguing that the relative was not a victim within the meaning of section 722 of the Criminal Code and that the real victim was none other than the administration of justice in a perjury case. The question was whether the victim impact statement was admissible in this case. The Court noted that the deceased victim's mother suffered physical or emotional harm or loss as a result of the false testimony given by the accused during the police investigation; therefore, the statement is admissible in the sentencing proceedings, in accordance with section 722 of the Criminal Code.