Bibliothèque des droits des victimes

In this case, the Crown sought a mandatory injunction to compel the CBC to remove from its website certain information identifying a murder victim under the age of 18, despite a publication ban ordered under section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code. The publication ban was intended to protect the victim's identity. The CBC had published articles containing information about the victim before the prohibition was imposed and had not removed them thereafter. The issue raised was whether there was a breach of the publication prohibition by leaving articles published before the order accessible on its website, and whether that breach constituted a criminal contempt requiring a mandatory injunction to remove the articles. The judge dismissed the Crown's application for a mandatory injunction. The Court concluded that the Crown had not demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted...

The case pits the Crown against the Clark couple, who are accused of causing the death of their son through criminal negligence and failing to assist a person in danger. A publication ban was imposed during the preliminary inquiry to protect the identity of the accused and, by extension, that of their deceased son and their two surviving children. The media opposed the imposition of the publication ban, seeking to have the preliminary inquiry judge's decision overturned. The main legal issue raised was whether the judge presiding over the preliminary inquiry had erred in granting the publication ban. The Court concluded that the judge presiding over the preliminary inquiry had erred in granting the publication ban, as the child's siblings are not considered victims within the meaning of the relevant sections of the Criminal Code.

In this case, Mr Darby was charged with accessory after the fact to murder. The prosecution requested to present statements from the victims' relatives and argued that even if Darby was an accessory, the relatives were victims of his offence. The defence lawyer considered that there was no sufficient link between Darby's actions and their victimisation resulting from the death of their family members. He argued that the statements could be prejudicial. The Court admitted the statements of the relatives, emphasising that ‘the role of victims in the criminal justice system has been clarified in the Victims' Rights Charter Act. With regard to the definition of victim, the Court considered that complicity after the fact in a murder is not a victimless crime and that assisting murderers creates a close link between the actions of the accomplice and the victimisation of these families.

The defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon. At the sentencing hearing, the Crown prosecutor requested to present statements from two witnesses considered victims under section 722(4) of the Criminal Code because they had been traumatised by the offence committed against the complainant. The defendant's lawyer opposed the admission of these statements on the grounds that they did not meet the definition of ‘victim.’ The Court interpreted the law literally, emphasising that: ‘we must be careful not to attribute to Parliament the intention of ensuring that any person who was merely a witness after the fact to the consequences of the crime be considered a “victim” within the meaning of the law.’ It concluded that the witnesses' statements on the impact of the crime should be excluded because they did not meet the definition of ‘victim.’

The appellant was convicted of mischief and unlawful entry in connection with incidents of food tampering in a supermarket and sentenced to 33 months and three weeks. The appellant appealed and requested a reduction in sentence. The question raised was whether the judge had erred in law in determining the sentence by relying on the victims' statements. The appellant argued that the victims' statements had been wrongly admitted and used. The respondent defended the admissibility and use of the victims' statements. He argued that the judge had behaved in an exemplary manner towards the appellant and maintained that the sentence was appropriate in view of the aggravating factors and the absence of mitigating factors. The Court rejected the appellant's argument, noting that all persons who had submitted statements were legitimately entitled to do so. The appeal was dismissed and the sentence imposed by the Provincial Court judge was upheld.

In this first-degree murder case, the defense requested the personal details of 13 individuals for investigative purposes without informing them of the disclosure. The prosecution agreed to disclose the information of eight individuals but under restrictive conditions. The question was whether the defense should obtain the personal details of 13 individuals without informing them for investigative purposes. The court ordered the disclosure of the personal details of the eight individuals mentioned by the defense, with due regard for their privacy and dignity. For the other four individuals, the court ordered the prosecution to inform them of the defense's request to interview them, while seeking to strike a balance between the right to privacy and the right to a full defense.

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder after the victim's body was discovered in suspicious circumstances, showing signs of violence and sexual assault. He was acquitted of the murder charges, but the trial judge sentenced him to 12 years' imprisonment for manslaughter. The defendant argued that the sentence imposed was unreasonably high, exceeding the range prescribed for cases of manslaughter in a domestic context. The prosecution responded that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and consistent with sentencing jurisprudence. The issue was whether the judge had erred in taking into account certain aggravating factors that had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that most of the factors considered aggravating by the trial judge were valid. It noted that the 12-year sentence, although severe, was within the range established for cases of manslaughter involving domestic violence.

L’affaire concerne un individu poursuivi pour des actes d’agressions sexuelles, du harcèlement et la transmission d’images intimes. Dans le cadre du procès criminel, une témoin, désignée F.A.R., souhaite que son témoignage se déroule à huis clos en raison de son caractère hautement sensible et du risque d’atteinte à sa vie privée et à sa dignité. L’intervenante au procès soutient que la publicité des débats judiciaires est fondamentale et une exclusion complète du public doit être évitée. Il était question de savoir si l’exclusion complète du public en vertu de l’article 486(1) du Code criminel est justifiée, considérant la nécessité de protéger la victime. La Cour a jugé que la situation vécue par F.A.R. engendre un stress intense et une atteinte possible à sa dignité si son témoignage était livré publiquement, ce qui pourrait dissuader une participation complète et franche. Elle ordonne un huis clos pour cette partie de la procédure.

In this case, the accused was found guilty and sentenced by the trial court to one year's imprisonment for sexual offences against a 12-year-old child. The Crown appealed and proposed an increase in the sentence that would adequately reflect the seriousness of the offences and the principles of denunciation and deterrence. The respondent argued that the sentence was appropriate. The question was whether the principles of denunciation and deterrence were properly taken into account in determining the sentence. The Court found that the offences caused serious psychological harm to the victim, such as suicidal thoughts and family conflicts. The objectives of denunciation and deterrence required the imposition of sentences that better reflected the seriousness and consequences of the deception. The Court concluded by imposing a total sentence of two years.

L’accusé a plaidé coupable de fraude et a remboursé les victimes dans le cadre de l'entente civile. La Couronne s’appuie sur une recommandation conjointe pour imposer une peine d’une année avec sursis. Les victimes souhaitent intervenir pour contester la recommandation, témoigner et demander un dédommagement malgré l’entente. L’accusée s’oppose à la demande de participation des victimes. La question était de savoir si les victimes peuvent contester la peine et que leur participation peut aller au-delà des articles 722 et 723 prévues par le Code criminel. Selon la Cour, bien que la charte canadienne confère des droits aux victimes, ceux-ci ne leur octroient pas un statut de partie ni le droit de contester une entente sur la peine. La Cour a conclu que les victimes peuvent témoigner ou lire leurs déclarations mais uniquement dans le cadre de l'article 722(1) du Code criminel.